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KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND 
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING 
CRAIG TURNER
 
ABSTRACT 
Deterrence-based punishment systems are scattered throughout 
history, and exist in the American legal system today. One such method of 
deterrence prescribes mandatory punishments for violations of certain 
crimes, without regarding to underlying circumstances or an assessment 
of the the individual accused of such crimes. These types of sentencing 
requirements restrict judicial discretion and are designed to serve as an 
example for other would-be offenders. While perhaps justifiable under a 
utilitarian code of ethics, mandatory minimums are morally suspect when 
assessed through the lens Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative. 
The fundamental premise of the second formulation of Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative rests upon human freedom and autonomy. By 
forcing individuals to personally serve punishments meant to deter others 
from committing the same crime can have the effect of treating such 
individual merely as a means to some other end. Because of this, 
mandatory punishments which seek to deter, and not rehabilitate offenders 
likely violate Kant’s Categorical Imperative. This Note examines the 
historical and current status of mandatory sentencing laws, and applies 
Kantian ethics to assess these laws’ morality. 
INTRODUCTION 
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is rooted in his formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative.
1
 The purpose of his Categorical Imperative is to 
serve as an analytical framework by which Kant theorized mankind could 
judge the morality of all human actions.
2
 Though scholars have analyzed 
deterrence-based punishment systems from a philosophical perspective,
3
 
 
 
  Primary Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. (2016), Washington 
University School of Law; B.M. (2011), Vanderbilt University. Thank you to my wife, Tiffany, and 
my family for all of their love and support.  
 1. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (18th ed. 
2012) [hereinafter, GROUNDWORK]. 
 2. R. George Wright, Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves: The Legal Implications of a 
Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 273–75 (2002). 
 3. Id. at 285–86.  
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they have not examined how Kant’s moral philosophy provides a unique 
framework to assess the morality of mandatory minimum sentencing for 
certain crimes. While criminal punishment is justifiable under Kant’s 
moral framework,
4
 the nature of mandatory minimum sentencing adopted 
as a deterrent to would-be criminals fails to satisfy Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative. 
This Note begins by examining the history, evolution, and current state 
of mandatory minimums to support the idea that mandatory minimum 
sentencing fails to satisfy Kant’s Categorical Imperative. To this end, this 
Note will explain the rationale behind the adoption of mandatory 
minimums across both historical and modern societies. Next, this Note 
describes Kant’s second formulation of his Categorical Imperative first 
espoused in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
5
 The analysis 
briefly addresses Kant’s views on punishment in the criminal context. 
Finally, this Note shows that mandatory minimum sentencing fails to 
comport with Kant’s moral code. 
I. THE WORLD HISTORY OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS  
Mandatory minimums are not a modern conception. Notions of 
mandatory punishments date back to ancient times and span across 
cultures.
6
 Although not explicitly dubbed “mandatory minimums,” traces 
of the implementation of automatic sentencing are present throughout 
history.
7
 Scholars assert that “[a]ll theories of retribution . . . require that 
punishment be proportionate to the gravity of the offense, and any decent 
retributive theory demands an upper sentencing limit.”8 Proportionality, at 
its most basic level, stands for this principle: For a crime of a certain kind 
and under certain circumstances, there is an implicit limit on the 
 
 
 4. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:331–6:332 [hereinafter, 
METAPHYSICS]. 
 5. See GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:427.  
 6. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 19:21 (King James) (“And thine eye shall not pity; but life shall go 
for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.”); Erik Luna, Testimony to the United 
States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Provisions Under Federal Law, THE 
CATO INSTITUTE (May 27, 2010), at n.3, http://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/ 
mandatory-minimum-sentencing-provisions-under-federal-law (citations omitted). The “eye for an 
eye” aspect of religious codes is similar to the idea of proportional response to certain crimes. Modern 
mandatory minimum sentences typically involve a term of years in prison, not the literal 
proportionality of ancient codes.  
 7. See Luna, supra note 6. 
 8. Id.; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 52–54 (5th ed. 2012). 
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government’s power to execute a sentence that is more severe than the 
act.
9
  
Mandatory minimums are contrary to the idea of proportionality 
because they “eliminate judicial discretion to impose a prison term lower 
than the statutory floor, making case-specific information about the 
offense and offender irrelevant, at least to the extent that these facts might 
call for a below-minimum sentence.”10 However, there are some who 
argue that mandatory minimums are just and proportionate value 
judgments because democratically elected representatives create these 
automatic punishments through legislation.
11
 Regardless of whether 
mandatory minimums actually comply with proportionality concerns, 
history frequently demonstrates the tension between the desire for 
proportional punishments and the adoption of mandatory punishments.  
Both the Holy Christian Bible and the Code of Hammurabi contain 
“eye for an eye” idioms.12 This phrase is commonly understood to mean 
that a punishment for a crime should be commensurate to the offense in 
question.
13
 However, while this language could be interpreted as 
expressing a desire for proportional punishment, there are contradictions 
to this inference found throughout religious texts.
14
 The Bible, for 
example, is replete with specific, mandatory punishments for certain 
 
 
 9. DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 52 (“Retributivists justify punishment on the ground that a crime 
has been committed. The offender owes a debt to society; punishment is the mode of repayment. The 
payment due varies with the crime committed: punishment must be proportional to the offense 
committed[.]”); see also Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 
DUKE L. J. 263, 284–85 (2005) (asserting that “even if a state were to abandon retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation in favor of some other penal purpose, basic principles of liberal 
democracy would still impose a proportionality requirement as an upper limit on criminal sentences.”). 
 10. See Luna, supra note 6.  
 11. See Evan Bernick & Paul Larkin, Reconsidering Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The 
Arguments for and Against Potential Reforms, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 20, 2014), available 
at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/02/reconsidering-mandatory-minimum-sentences-the 
-arguments-for-and-against-potential-reforms (“[A] number of parties defend the use of mandatory 
minimum terms of imprisonment. They argue that mandatory minimum sentences reflect a societal 
judgment that certain offenses demand a specified minimum sanction and thereby ensure that anyone 
who commits such a crime cannot avoid a just punishment.”). 
 12. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Robert A. Creo, Retribution, Revenge, Justice & Closure, 31 ALTERNATIVES TO 
THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 138 (2013). “Lex talionis, is Latin for the law of talion, which means a 
retaliation or punishment authorized by law that corresponds in kind and degree to the wrong or 
injury—in its classic formulation, an eye for an eye.” Id. “[A]ny laws, such as the Babylonian laws, 
achieved justice by principles of reciprocity, so a person causing the death of another would be put to 
death under . . . the Code of Hammurabi . . . [Hammurabi’s Code] states that if a man put out the eye 
of another man, his eye shall be put out. The Bible books of Exodus and Leviticus also contain this 
language.” Id.  
 14. See Luna, supra note 6. 
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actions.
15
 Further, these punishments were neither constrained by 
questions of offender culpability nor directed at preventing future 
wrongdoing.
16
 The punishments, therefore, were justified on their own 
grounds, which is a common aspect of mandatory minimum 
punishments.
17
 
The conflict between proportional response as reflected in judicial 
discretion and the existence of mandatory punishments was present in 
ancient Greece. In the seventh century B.C.E., Draco, the first legislator of 
Athens, replaced the old system of oral law with a written code to be 
enforced solely by the courts.
18
 He prescribed mandatory sentences 
(usually death or exile) for even the most trivial offenses.
19
 Draco’s laws,20 
which even today remain infamous for their severity, exemplified 
mandatory punishments in ancient Greece. However, in 350 B.C.E., 
Aristotle declared that it was the judge’s duty to impose a punishment that 
was equivalent to the crime committed.
21
  
The tension between proportionality and mandatory sentences also 
existed in ancient Rome. There, Cicero, the renowned Roman politician, 
“proclaimed the maxim that the punishment should fit the offense.”22 At 
the same time, the Roman Army instituted mandatory punishments, such 
 
 
 15. See, e.g., Leviticus 20:1–20:27 (King James). This passage contains punishments such as: 
“for every one that curseth his father or his mother shall be surely put to death: he hath cursed his 
father or his mother among you” and “if a man lie with a beast, he shall surely be put to death: and ye 
shall slay the beast.” Id. 
 16. Id. The punishments outlined in Leviticus were not written as optional. 
 17. See infra note 69. 
 18. See Harry Keyishian, Henry DeBracton, Renaissance Punishment Theory, and 
Shakespearean Closure, 20 LAW AND LITERATURE 444, 447 (2008). 
 19. Id. “Motive is the key to determining whether or not an act is punishable. Considerations of 
‘intent’ are so integral to the fabric of modern law that we can easily forget its radical quality. Draco's 
law did not concern itself with such intent; punishment was matched to the deed, not to the character 
or motive of the actor of the deed.” Id. 
 20. In response to an aristocrat’s attempt to take over the city, Draco was appointed by the 
Athenian aristocracy “to codify and rectify the existing law” in an attempt to “reinforce the old 
aristocratic system.” Deirdre Dionysia von Dornum, The Straight and the Crooked: Legal 
Accountability in Ancient Greece, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (1997). Draco then published the 
first legal code of Athens. Id. What remains of Draco’s laws details elaborate “procedures for settling 
disputes arising out of homicide” and “combined fixed remuneration (expressed in terms of oxen) with 
generous use of the death penalty.” Id. While Draco’s laws were unsuccessful in their initial purpose 
of curing political issues in the city, they did provide Athenian citizens with “indisputable knowledge 
of the laws that governed them,” unlike the previous legal code which was largely oral. Id. The man 
and his laws are also the origin of the commonly used English adjective “draconian.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 566 (9th ed. 2009). 
 21. ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 179–82 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1976). 
 22. See Luna, supra note 6 (citing CICERO, DE RE PUBLICE, DE LEGIBUS 513 (Clinton Walker 
Keyes trans., 1928)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/8
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as fustuarium,
23
 for dereliction of one’s duties.24 Thus, while the state 
appeared to espouse a sliding scale system of punishment for its citizens, 
the state’s military utilized punishments for soldiers that were both 
mandated and severe. 
French thinkers also advocated for proportionality in the mid-to-late 
eighteenth century.
25
 Montesquieu wrote that justice is served “when 
criminal laws derive each punishment from the particular nature of the 
crime. There are then no arbitrary decisions [when] the punishment does 
not flow from the capriciousness of the legislator, but from the very nature 
of the thing.”26 However, even in his own country, the French Penal Code 
of 1791 contained legislatively fixed sanctions for each offense category 
with zero discretion allowed when sentencing individual offenders.
27
  
Similarly, British jurisprudence struggled to strike a balance between 
severity of punishment and proportionality. Great Britain actually 
attempted to set this principle in statute in 1553, under the rationale that:  
the security of the kingdom depended more upon the love of the 
subject toward the king than upon the dread of laws imposing 
rigorous penalties and that laws made for the preservation of the 
commonwealth without great penalties were often more obeyed and 
kept than laws made with extreme punishments.
28
  
Great Britain was unique with regard to statutorily mandated sentencing 
because such statutes only first appeared in British law in the Crime 
 
 
 23. See WILLIAM SMITH, D.C.L., LL.D.: A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 
(John Murray ed., 1875). Fustuarium is “a capital punishment inflicted upon the Roman soldiers for 
desertion, theft, and similar crimes.” Id. 
 24. POLYBIUS, THE COMPLETE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS 353 (W.R. Paton trans., 2009). Polybius 
describes the process and ritual of Fustuarium as follows: 
The tribune takes a cudgel and just touches the condemned man with it, after which all in the 
camp beat or stone him, in most cases dispatching him in the camp itself. But even those who 
manage to escape are not saved thereby: impossible! for they are not allowed to return to their 
homes, and none of the family would dare to receive such a man in his house. 
Id.  
 25. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans., 1989). 
 26. Id. at 207–08. 
 27. See Paul W. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
529 (1958), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2764&context= 
lcp (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). 
 28. RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 236 (1959). This text also examines the 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” that existed in British jurisprudence, and 
eventually extended into the United States Constitution. Id. This idea was based “on the longstanding 
principle of English law that the punishment should fit the crime.” Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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(Sentences) Act of 1997.
29
 Even today, the United Kingdom imposes 
statutory minimum sentencing for only a few offenses, preferring to leave 
discretion to judges.
30
 Historically, British common law did, however, 
practice automatic, non-statutory capital punishment for certain crimes.
31
 
While British jurisprudence’s preference for proportionality and judicial 
discretion infiltrated colonial law and early state constitutions 
significantly, statutorily mandated punishments have only been a part of 
the American judicial system since the late eighteenth century.
32
 
II. AMERICAN HISTORY OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS 
Early American colonial society appeared to limit the use of mandated 
punishment.
33
 Even early, post-revolution state constitutions contained 
language that appeared to favor proportionality of sentencing, such as the 
Charter of Maryland, which spoke about punishments in relation to the 
“Quality of the Offence.”34 The Federal Constitution grants Congress the 
power to institute criminal offenses and to set certain punishments for 
violation of those offenses.
35
 That being said, no federal crimes existed at 
 
 
 29. See Crime (Sentences) Act, pt. I, §§ 2–4, (1997), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/ 
43/pdfs/ukpga_19970043_en.pdf (last visited on Nov. 22, 2014). For example, this law creates a 
mandatory life sentence where a person is convicted of a second serious offense such as attempted 
murder, rape, or a robbery while in possession of a firearm or imitation firearm. Id. The Act also 
extended to drug offense, imposing a mandatory seven-year sentence for a third Class A drug 
trafficking offense. Id. 
 30. See Josh Guetzkow & Bruce Western, The Political Consequences of Mass Imprisonment, in 
REMAKING AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY 228, 233 (Joe 
Soss et al. eds., 2007). 
 31. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (detailing how at common 
law, all non-justified, unexcused homicides were automatically punished by death). 
 32. United States Sentencing Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties 
in the Federal Criminal Justice System (Oct. 2011), at 7 [hereinafter Comm’n Rept.]. 
 33. See Woodson, supra note 31, at 289 (“Although the range of capital offenses in the American 
Colonies was quite limited in comparison to the more than 200 offenses then punishable by death in 
England, the Colonies at the time of the Revolution imposed death sentences on all persons convicted 
of any of a considerable number of crimes, typically including at a minimum, murder, treason, piracy, 
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy. As at common law, all homicides that were not 
involuntary, provoked, justified, or excused constituted murder and were automatically punished by 
death.”). However, “Colonial legislatures [still] established fixed penalties for most criminal offenses 
and allowed courts little or no flexibility when imposing punishment in individual cases.” Gary T. 
Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing 
Reform, 81 CAL L. REV. 61, 68 (1993). Some of these punishment included fines, whipping, forced 
labor, and death. Id. 
 34. See PERRY, supra note 28, at 107. 
 35. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This grant of power is well-settled and based in Congress’s 
enumerated powers under the Constitution. In United States v. Comstock, the Court stated: 
Thus, the Constitution, which nowhere speaks explicitly about the creation of federal crimes 
beyond those related to counterfeiting, treason, or Piracies and Felonies committed on the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/8
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all until the passage of the 1790 Crimes Act,
36
 which contained twenty-
three federal crimes.
37
 The passage of these federal crimes also included 
the first mandatory statutory sentencing under federal law.
38
 Under the 
Act, capital punishment was mandated for “treason, murder, three offenses 
related to piracy, forgery of a public security of the United States, and the 
rescue of a person convicted of a capital crime.”39 Several of these crimes 
are still punished with a mandatory penalty today.
40
 Although these were 
the first statutorily mandated sentences in the United States, this 
codification actually significantly limited the types of offenses that 
required capital punishment at common law.
41
 
Throughout the late 1700s and the early 1800s, Congress enacted its 
first mandatory prison terms.
42
 Beginning in the early 1800s, Congress 
sporadically enacted laws that generally backed away from mandatory 
minimum sentencing
43
 but also affirmed their use in certain specific 
contexts.
44
 Then, during the Civil War, Congress utilized mandatory 
minimum sentencing to “target[] individuals allied with the 
Confederacy.”45 While it is difficult to determine exactly how many 
offenses carried mandatory penalties up to this point in American 
history,
46
 Congress created the Revised Statutes in the 1870s, which first 
codified the federal law.
47
 At this point, “[a]t least 108 offenses codified in 
the Revised Statutes carried a mandatory penalty. . . . Of these 108 
offenses, 16 mandated death” and “at least 92 of those offenses carried a 
mandatory term of imprisonment.”48  
 
 
high Seas or against the Law of Nations, nonetheless grants Congress broad authority to 
create such crimes. And Congress routinely exercises its authority to enact criminal laws in 
furtherance of, for example, its enumerated powers to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce, to enforce civil rights, to spend funds for the general welfare, to establish federal 
courts, to establish post offices, to regulate bankruptcy, to regulate naturalization, and so 
forth. 
560 U.S. 126, 135–36 (2010) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 36. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 7. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 7.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 8 n.22. 
 41. Id. at 9 (“[T]he debates and Congress’s decision to impose death for seven offenses and 
discretionary terms of imprisonment for the others was a departure from the prevalent use of 
mandatory death penalties during the colonial period.”). 
 42. Id. at 9.  
 43. See id. at 10 n.43. 
 44. Id. at 11. 
 45. Id. at 13. 
 46. Id. at 15. 
 47. See id. at 15 (citation omitted). 
 48. Id. at 15–16.  
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In the early 1900s, Congress set out to revise its laws and formed a 
commission charged with revising the federal code.
49
 The United States 
Sentencing Commission advised Congress to repeal many of the 
mandatory minimum penalties for many crimes that were “not punishable 
by death.”50 As a result of the Commission’s recommendations and 
reasoning,
51
 the 1909 Criminal Code “repealed at least 31 of the 
mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment” codified in the Revised 
Statutes.
52
 Following this mass repeal of mandatory sentencing, Congress 
once again instituted mandatory punishments to give teeth to legislation in 
the Prohibition Era.
53
 However, these mandatory punishments were 
repealed by the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1935.
54
 
Even with the glut of Congressional activity surrounding mandatory 
minimums, they remained rare in the federal system until the passage of 
The Boggs Act of 1951
55
 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956.
56
 The 
Narcotics Control Act of 1956 “imposed stiff mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug importation and distribution in an effort to more 
effectively deter those offenses.”57 Like the mandatory punishments 
adopted during the era of the Civil War, these new Acts were largely 
reactionary, responding to a dramatic increase in drug use following 
World War II.
58
 However, these mandatory minimums differed from those 
 
 
 49. Id. at 18. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 19. In their recommendations to Congress to repeal certain mandatory minimum 
sentences, the committee reasoned the following:  
The committee has also adopted a uniform method of fixing in all offenses not punishable by 
death the maximum punishment only, leaving the minimum to the discretion of the trial 
judge. The criminal law necessarily subjects to its corrective discipline all who violate its 
provisions. The weak and the vicious, the first offender and the atrocious criminal, the mere 
technical transgressor and the expert in crime are alike guilty of the same offense. In the one 
case the utmost severity of punishment can scarcely provide the protection to which society is 
entitled; in the other anything except a nominal punishment may effectually prevent the 
reclamation of the offender. 
Id. 
 52. Id. at 20. 
 53. Id. at 21. 
 54. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
 55. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 22 (citing Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767 (1951)).  
 56. Id.; see also The Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567 (1956) 
(repealed 1970), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-70/pdf/STATUTE-70-
Pg567.pdf. 
 57. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 
200–01 (1993). 
 58. See Richard C. Boldt, Drug Policy in Context: Rhetoric and Practice in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, 62 S.C. L. REV. 261, 285–86 (2010) (“In the post-World War II period, the 
incidence of illegal narcotics use in the United States increased substantially. Congress responded in 
1951 with passage of the Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act, which for the first time introduced 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/8
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in the past in that they called for lengthier penalties and applied to 
“offenses not traditionally covered by such penalties.”59 The Acts 
implemented harsh mandatory sentences for drug-related offenses 
including a minimum sentence of five to twenty years for a first-time 
offense of marijuana importation.
60
 In 1970, Congress repealed “nearly 
all” of these laws with the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 and declared that they had failed to meet their 
intended goals of deterrence, instead resulting in injustices toward 
offenders.
61
  
Nevertheless, since the 1980s, Congress has enacted many new 
mandatory minimum punishments for offenses.
62
 Not only did this round 
of legislation include some drug offenses that were repealed in 1970,
63
 it 
also extended mandatory sentencing to certain firearms offenses,
64
 sexual 
offenses toward children,
65
 and identity theft.
66
 Since the 1980s, the 
number of federal crimes has increased at a rate of 56.5 new crimes per 
year, and “the number of criminal offenses in the United States Code [has] 
increased to 4,450” as of 2008,67 not including criminal offenses 
promulgated by various government agencies.
68
 A total of 83,946 federal 
criminal cases were heard in 2010; 19,896 defendants were tried and 
convicted under federal statutes containing a mandatory minimum 
penalty.
69
 Currently, “there are over 100 mandatory minimum sentence 
 
 
severe mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain drug offenses. In 1956, following highly 
publicized hearings . . . [with] agents in the Bureau of Narcotics, Congress passed yet another 
provision increasing prison sentences and fines for drug offenses.”). 
 59. Vera Institute of Justice, Report To Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System, 24 FED. SENT. R. 185 (2012). 
 60. See Narcotics Control Act of 1956, supra note 56. 
 61. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 22. 
 62. Id. at 23–29. 
 63. See id. at 23 (citing The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 
(1986)). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 
142–43 (1995) (“924(c)(1) requires the imposition of specified penalties if . . . there is a [sufficient 
showing of] active employment of the firearm by the defendant . . . in relation to the predicate 
offense.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 65. See e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251. 
 66. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a). 
 67. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 65 (quoting John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive 
Growth of Federal Crimes, HERITAGE FOUNDATION MEMO NO. 26 at 1 (June 16, 2008)). 
 68. Id.; see also Overcriminalization: An Explosion of Federal Criminal Law, HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION FACT SHEET NO. 86 (Apr. 27, 2011), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/fact 
sheets/2011/04/overcriminalization-an-explosion-of-federal-criminal-law. The Heritage Foundation 
stated that even “the Congressional Research Service itself admitted that it was unable to even count” 
the offenses to a certainty. Id. However, they estimate the number to be in the “tens of thousands.” Id. 
 69. See Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 66–67. 
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provisions in the federal code.”70 While there have been recent pushes to 
limit their use,
71
 mandatory minimums are still prevalent in the federal 
system. 
Mandatory minimum sentencing remains a source of controversy in the 
current political and judicial landscapes in the United States.
72
 In United 
 
 
 70. Maggie E. Harris, The Cost of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 
419, 424 (2013). Some of the most common and recognizable examples of federal crimes that contain 
mandatory statutory minimums include: domestic drug trafficking, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012) 
(triggering mandatory sentences starting at ten years and up to life whenever a drug trafficking crime 
involves, for example, more than one kilogram of heroin or more than 280 milligrams of crack 
cocaine); drug importation and exportation, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (2006) (minimum of 10 years 
where for a first offense involving the importation of drugs where no serious bodily injury results); 
using a gun during the commission of a crime, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (mandating 
five added years to the sentence when using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence or a drug 
trafficking crime); immigration-related crimes, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (mandating a 
three year sentence for harboring an alien with the intent that the unlawful alien will commit a felony); 
identity theft, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2005) (two years added to the underlying charge when it 
includes aggravated identity theft); sex offenses directed toward children, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) 
(2012) (requiring fifteen years for the sex trafficking of children under fourteen by means of fraud or 
coercion); the three strikes law, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1) (2012) (life in prison upon the conviction 
of a serious felony where the offender has two or more prior serious violent felony convictions); 
crimes involving explosives or airplane hijackings, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2272(b) (2014) (thirty year 
minimum sentence for using, attempting to use, or threatening while possessing, an atomic weapon); 
murder and crimes against children, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (2014) (mandating life imprisonment or 
death for the first-degree murder of federal officers); obstruction of justice, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2014) 
(one month mandatory sentence for refusing to testify before Congress); crimes involving food stamps, 
e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (six month mandatory sentence for a second offense of illegal food stamp 
activity; and kidnaping, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(1) (twenty year minimum for a the kidnaping of a 
minor); certain types of fraud, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4221 (2014) (one year minimum for the forgery of a 
notary seal); organized crime, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 225(a) (2014) (ten year minimum for running a 
criminal enterprise). Federal Mandatory Minimums, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS 
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Chart-All-Fed-MMs-NW.pdf. 
 71. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to 
Reduce Drug Trafficking Sentences (Apr. 10, 2014) http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/ 
press-releases-and-news-advisories/press-releases/20140410_Press_Release.pdf.; Liz Halloran, How 
Long Is Too Long? Congress Revisits Mandatory Sentences (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
itsallpolitics/2014/01/08/260797831/how-long-is-too-long-congress-revisits-mandatory-sentences; Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-220, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s1789enr/ 
pdf/BILLS-111s1789enr.pdf (eliminating the mandatory minimum sentence of 21 U.S.C. 844(a) for 
simple possession of cocaine). 
 72. See Letter from Karen J. Mathis, President, American Bar Association, to The Honorable 
Bobby Scott, Chair, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security & The Honorable 
Randy Forbes, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime Terrorism, and Homeland Security (July 3, 
2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/letters/crimlaw/ 
2007jul03_minimumsenth_l.authcheckdam.pdf. Leading criminal justice organizations such as the 
American Bar Association oppose the use of mandatories. Id. (“[T]he American Bar Association 
supports repeal of federal mandatory minimum sentencing laws. We urge the Judiciary Committee to 
conduct further hearings on this subject.”). Many American judges have criticized Congress’ use and 
application of mandatory minimums. Notably, Justice Breyer, who was the “architect of the 
Sentencing Guidelines” has expressed criticism. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the 
Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 872 n.13 (2009) 
[hereinafter Institutional Design]. Justice Breyer stated: “[m]andatory minimum statutes are 
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States v. Booker,
73
 the United States Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b)(1), which made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines mandatory,
74
 
could not coexist with the jury trial requirement of the Sixth Amendment. 
Justice Breyer concluded that the Guidelines, in order to avoid 
unconstitutionality, must be read as merely “advisory while maintaining a 
strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender's real 
conduct—a connection important to the increased uniformity of 
sentencing that Congress intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”75 
While some organizations expressed “cautious optimism”76 regarding the 
 
 
fundamentally inconsistent with Congress' simultaneous effort to create a fair, honest, and rational 
sentencing system through the use of Sentencing Guidelines.” Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 
570 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment.). Even conservative politicians 
have come out against mandatory minimums. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: 
The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a 
Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 194–95 (1993). Conversely, 
politicians sometimes “view being tough on crime as a badge of honor that wins points with voters.” 
Institutional Design, at 873 n.14 (detailing various politician’s statements on the Congressional Record 
which demonstrate support for mandatory minimum penalties because it deters or is tough on crime). 
 73. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the defendant’s sentence was enhanced based on findings of 
the judge, and were not given to the jury for reasonable doubt determinations pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. at 233. The Court concluded that the sentencing guidelines were merely advisory, 
severing the mandatory language from the statute. Id. This holding dealt only with the sentencing 
guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission and did not affect statutorily created mandatory 
minimums. Understanding Booker and Fanfan: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Are Advisory, but 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences still stand, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, available at 
http://famm.org/Repository/Files/Booker%20Fanfan%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last accessed Apr. 23, 
2016). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012). This section of the statute states:  
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within 
the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result 
in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a circumstance was 
adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, 
policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. In the absence of 
an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due 
regard for the purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable 
sentencing guideline in the case of an offense other than a petty offense, the court shall also 
have due regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by 
guidelines applicable to similar offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy 
statements of the Sentencing Commission. 
Id. 
 75. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246. “Congress' basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move 
the sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity. That uniformity does not consist simply 
of similar sentences for those convicted of violations of the same statute. . . . It consists, more 
importantly, of similar relationships between sentences and real conduct, relationships that Congress' 
sentencing statutes helped to advance and that Justice Stevens’ approach would undermine.” Id. at 
253–54 (internal citations omitted). 
 76. See Understanding Booker and Fanfan, supra note 73. 
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holding of Booker for placing more sentencing discretion for certain 
crimes, Booker only affected those sentencing guidelines promulgated by 
the United States Sentencing Commission.
77
 Post-Booker, the mandatory 
sentencing minimums and statutory maximums enacted by Congress still 
govern unless some exception applies.
78
 
Currently, there are only two exceptions to mandatory minimum 
sentences: the “substantial assistance”79 exception and the “safety valve”80 
exception. Criminal defendants can use the substantial assistance 
exception by providing information that substantially assists the 
Government “in the investigation or prosecution of another person who 
has committed an offense.”81 In Wade v. United States,82 the United States 
Supreme Court clarified this exception by holding that sentencing courts 
may depart from mandatory minimum requirements only when a motion is 
made to do so by the government.
83
 Wade further held that courts “may 
review the government’s refusal to bring a substantial assistance motion 
only if the government based the refusal on a constitutionally 
impermissible motive.”84 Thus, it is almost completely at the discretion of 
the prosecutor as to whether such a motion will be brought. The use of 
substantial assistance exception motions is quite common, and their use 
has remained fairly consistent in cases over the past two decades.
85
 This 
exception has also been included in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to allow for a motion to be made within one year following 
sentencing
86
 and even after a year has passed under certain 
 
 
 77. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246. 
 78. See infra notes 79–81.  
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012). 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012). 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012). 
 82. 504 U.S. 181 (1992). 
 83. Id. at 185. 
 84. Julie Gyurci, Prosecutorial Discretion to Bring a Substantial Assistance Motion Pursuant to 
a Plea Agreement: Enforcing a Good Faith Standard, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1253–54 (1994). 
 85. In 1992, 15 percent of all defendants sentenced using the federal guidelines benefited from 
substantial assistance downward departures at sentencing. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 1992 Annual 
Report 125 (1993). In 2013, the Government filed a motion of substantial assistance in approximately 
12.1 percent of all cases. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2013 Annual Report 39 (2014), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/152376NCJRS.pdf (last accessed Apr. 23, 2016).  
 86. See Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 35(b)(1) (“Upon the government's motion made within one year of 
sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial 
assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.”); see also Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 35(b)(4) 
(“When acting under Rule 35(b), the court may reduce the sentence to a level below the minimum 
sentence established by statute.”). 
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circumstances.
87
 Criticisms of the substantial assistance exception are what 
led, in part, to the adoption of the safety valve exception for certain drug 
offenses.
88
 
By the mid-1990s, more than 100 federal judges declined to preside 
over cases involving low-level drug offense cases requiring the application 
of mandatory minimum sentences.
89
 Judge Frank Easterbrook of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals harshly criticized mandatory minimums 
and asserted that the substantial assistance exception is of no use to a low-
level drug offender.
90
 In his view, low-level drug offenders used as drug 
mules “lack the contacts and trust necessary to set up big deals, and they 
know little information of value. Whatever tales they have to tell, their 
bosses will have related.”91 Additionally, he stated that “[d]efendants 
unlucky enough to be innocent have no information at all, and are more 
likely to want vindication at trial, losing not only the opportunity to make 
a deal but also the 2-level reduction the sentencing guidelines provide for 
accepting responsibility.”92 The result of this type of exception alone is the 
potential for inverted sentencing,
93
 favoring the more serious offenders 
because of the information to which they had access.  
Due to these inequitable results, Congress enacted the safety valve 
exception.
94
 The safety valve applies only to non-violent, first-time, 
 
 
 87. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 35(b)(2) (“Upon the government's motion made more than one year after 
sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the defendant's substantial assistance involved: 
(A) information not known to the defendant until one year or more after sentencing; (B) information 
provided by the defendant to the government within one year of sentencing, but which did not become 
useful to the government until more than one year after sentencing; or (C) information the usefulness 
of which could not reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant until more than one year after 
sentencing and which was promptly provided to the government after its usefulness was reasonably 
apparent to the defendant.”). 
 88. See infra note 89. 
 89. Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1863 (1995). 
 90. See United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317, 317–18 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 91. Id. at 317. 
 92. Id. at 317–18. 
 93. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's 
Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 209 (1997) 
(providing an example of case where a more culpable defendant received lighter sentence). Inverted 
sentencing is a phenomenon where those who have actually committed more serious offenses get less 
harsh sentences because of their ability to exchange information they learned in their capacity as a 
major player in the criminal enterprise. See Schulhofer, supra note 57, at 213 (“[M]andatory system 
can become an inverted pyramid”). But cf. Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A 
Year of Judicial Revolt on “Substantial Assistance” Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial 
Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 48–50 (1999) (arguing that inverted sentencing is very rare). 
 94. See Oliss, supra note 89, at 1886 (detailing the reasons for the addition of the safety valve). 
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federal drug offenses and requires application of a rigid five-part test.
95
 
This test must be satisfied in order for a judge to issue a sentence below 
the statutorily required minimum. Under the safety valve statute, if the 
defendant meets the elements of the test,
96
 the judge is required to go 
through the case “as if sentencing a defendant who is not subject to 
mandatory minimum sentence.”97 The judge then applies the sentencing 
guideline’s mitigating factors to determine an appropriate sentence.98 The 
comments of Judge Easterbrook and the two exceptions enacted by 
Congress are evidence of pushback against the rigid application and 
unintended effects mandatory minimum sentencing can create. However, 
the safety valve exception, due to its narrow scope and application, does 
not fully address Congress’s purpose of correcting sentence disparities 
resulting from federal mandatories.
99
 
 
 
 95. See Comm’n Rept. 34-36. There is a five-part test to obtain downward sentencing relief 
under the safety valve exception. Accord 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994). The statute states: 
[T]he court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United States 
Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28 without regard to any statutory 
minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded 
the opportunity to make a recommendation, that— 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under the 
sentencing guidelines; 
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or 
other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the 
offense; 
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; 
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the 
offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a continuing 
criminal enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act; and 
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to 
the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or 
offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the 
fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or that the 
Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the 
court that the defendant has complied with this requirement. 
Id. 
 96. The defendant has the burden of proof under the statute to demonstrate they meet the 
requirements of the test. See, e.g., United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 97. Jane L. Froyd, Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 94 NW. U. L REV. 1471, 1498 (2000). 
 98. Id. at 1496–97. 
 99. Oliss, supra note 89, at 1855. First of all, the statute is only limited to low-level drug 
offenses, and does not address many of the other federal crimes for which there are mandatory 
sentences. Id. Additionally, there are many instances of cases where low-level drug offenders fail to 
meet one of the elements. See, e.g., United States v. Bazel, 80 F.3d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(denying safety valve relief for a defendant because the defendant had a criminal history); United 
States v. Chen, 127 F.3d 286, 291 (2d Cir. 1997) (denying relief under the safety valve because 
defendant was in possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense); United States v. 
Contreras, 136 F.3d 1245, 1246 (9th Cir. 1998) (denying defendant sentencing relief under the safety 
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While the two discussed exceptions are clear examples of attempts to 
ameliorate some of the more draconian consequences of mandatory 
minimum penalties, Professor Rachel Barkow contends that legislators 
“lack the incentives to enact [sentencing] reforms as long as they reap 
political rewards for looking tough on crime.”100 In addition to the political 
gains from appearing to be tough on crime, the families, communities, and 
people who are most affected by mandatory sentencing provisions do not 
form a very powerful interest group
101
 compared to groups who support 
sentencing rules that favor the government.
102
  
III. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CODE 
The principal rationales of mandatory sentencing laws are utilitarian in 
nature.
103
 Proponents of mandatory minimums offer many reasons 
supporting mandatories, such as keeping chronic offenders off the 
streets.
104
 While long prison sentences for “recidivists, drug traffickers, 
and those who commit violent crimes isolate them from the general 
community . . . [m]andatory sentencing provisions are also designed to 
deter, sending the message to potential offenders that harsh consequences 
 
 
valve because the statements he made were not to the government’s lawyer, but to his probation 
officer); United States v. Marin, 144 F.3d 1085, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that “the district court 
committed error in granting [the defendant], who did not provide a complete and truthful account 
during his presentencing interview, repeated opportunities throughout the sentencing hearing to change 
his story in order to avail himself of the safety valve.”).  
 100. Institutional Design, supra note 72, at 873 n.13. 
 101. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005) (presenting a 
detailed discussion on political and interest groups’ effects on sentencing guidelines). There are some 
interest groups that do advocate for sentencing reform like Families Against Mandatory Minimums, 
the Western Prison Project, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Id. However, in many states 
felons are barred from voting, which further weakens and already less than powerful interest group. Id. 
 102. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or 
Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 
1089 (1993). Donald Dripps compared groups that support sentencing guidelines favorable to the 
government and groups that support sentencing guidelines favorable to defendants, and stated that 
“[y]ou don’t need a calculator to figure out that more will be bid on behalf of the government than will 
be against it.” Id. 
 103. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice 
System at 13–15 (1991). Utilitarianism is “a doctrine that the useful is the good and that the 
determining consideration of right conduct should be the usefulness of its consequences.” MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/utilitarianism (last accessed Jan. 25, 
2015). 
 104. See Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 87; see also Donald E. Lewis, The General Deterrent 
Effect of Longer Sentences, 26 BRIT. J. CRIM. 47, 60 (1986) (illustrating the deterrent effect from 
longer prison sentences). 
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follow from their criminal conduct.”105 Future criminals are deterred 
because the minimum penalties are certain, preventing potential criminals 
from being able to factor judicial leniency into their risk-taking 
behavior.
106
 Dr. David Mulhausen of the Heritage Foundation stated that 
“[i]ncreasing the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment will 
result in the utilitarian goal of reduced crime.”107 In the same vein, this 
deterrence assists local law enforcement in coercing cooperation.
108
 
Deterrence is founded upon the utilitarian mandate to maximize happiness 
and good in the world because there is less crime at the expense of those 
who are subject to mandatory minimums.
109
  
In addition to the specific (incapacitation) and general (diversion) 
deterrence of crime, some also see mandatory minimums as “promoting 
uniformity and reducing unwarranted disparities” in sentencing “because 
such penalties require courts to impose similar sentences for similar 
offenses.”110 The idea is that allowing too much discretion to judges leads 
to a greater variation in sentencing, thereby undermining “the goals of 
sentencing to treat like offenders alike.”111 Mandatory sentencing prevents 
this. 
Another argument, and perhaps the one that first comes to one’s mind 
when considering mandatory minimum punishments, is retribution.
112
 The 
retributivist argument posits that there are some crimes that are so terrible 
that they necessitate a sentencing floor to demonstrate society’s contempt 
 
 
 105. Lowenthal, supra note 33, at 67.  
 106. Id. at 77–78. 
 107. David B. Muhlhausen, Theories of Punishment and Mandatory Minimum Sentences, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 27, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/theories-of-
punishment-and-mandatory-minimum-sentences.  
 108. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 89. According to the report, “Commissioner Raymond 
Kelly of the New York Police Department testified that the potential application of more severe 
penalties in federal court ‘has convinced a number of suspects to give up information.’ Similarly, the 
Department of Justice views mandatory minimum pentalties as an ‘essential’ and ‘critical tool’ in 
obtaining ‘cooperation from members of violent street gangs and drug distribution networks.’” Id.  
 109. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, in WORKS 501 (J. Bowring ed., 1843) 
(stating that “[n]atural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical 
nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts” in support of the idea that the punished individual is an instrument 
for the betterment of society). 
 110. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 85.  
 111. Id. at 85–86. 
 112. See Muhlhausen, supra note 107 (“mandatory minimum sentences that establish long 
incarceration or death sentences for very serious and violent crimes can be justified based solely on the 
doctrine of just deserts”).  
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for the offense.
113
 This is certainly convincing when one looks at some the 
offenses for which Congress establishes mandatory punishments.
114
 
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CODE 
There are a multitude of practical arguments against the imposition of 
mandatory minimums in federal sentencing. First, opponents take issue 
with what proponents believe to be an argument for mandatory minimums: 
uniformity in sentencing.
115
 Opponents believe there can be too much 
uniformity in sentencing without adequate adjustments for offender 
culpability, resulting in criminals with differing levels of blameworthiness 
receiving identical sentences.
116
  
Opponents also criticize mandatory minimums for “producing 
sentences that are excessively harsh relative to the gravity of the offense 
committed.”117 Disproportionate sentencing affects minor offenders 
because when Congress enacted these laws, they only envisioned those 
who committed very serious versions of the offense.
118
 These 
disproportionate sentences result because, by mandating uniformity, 
individualized sentencing is made impossible.
119
 The judge no longer has 
the ability to take different factors into account when sentencing a 
criminal, for if he is found guilty of the basic elements of the crime in 
question, the sentence is prescribed.
120
 As a result, the consideration of a 
defendant’s particular situation is less determinative of a judge’s sentence 
than the charge initially brought by the prosecutors. This essentially 
transfers a discretion traditionally reserved for the judge to the 
prosecutor.
121
 This sort of rigidity inevitably results in situations where 
 
 
 113. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 88; see generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW 197–98 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (“It is morally fitting that an offender should suffer in 
proportion to [his] desert or culpable wrongdoing.”) (emphasis added). 
 114. See generally supra note 70.  
 115. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 90. 
 116. Id. at 90–91; see also id. at 90–91 n.486; THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 113. The idea 
that different criminals who are more or less guilty or culpable could receive identical punishment 
directly conflicts with Kant’s stance that criminals should receive their just “deserts.” THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 113. 
 117. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 92. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 95. 
 120. See supra note 70. 
 121. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 96–97. In State v. Barger, 810 P.2d 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990), a defendant was charged under a state statute that mandated a sentence of life imprisonment 
when he committed an aggravated assault while on parole for a violent offense. At sentencing, the trial 
judge expressed his frustration:  
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“the facts are bargainable” as a way for prosecutors to avoid imposing 
automatic minimum sentencing on those whom they think may not 
deserve such a punishment.
122
 Similarly, opponents criticize mandatory 
minimum penalties for their apparent unfair impact on racial minorities 
and those who are economically disadvantaged.
123
 
Studies show that there is little to no correlation between mandatory 
penalties and deterrence.
124
 Scholars have rejected the idea that mandatory 
minimums prevent criminals from engaging in criminal activity because of 
prospective harsh consequences.
125
 Some studies have demonstrated that 
criminal defendants are more likely to opt for plea agreements and forgo 
their right to trial.
126
 
While many strictly utilitarian legal philosophers see a deterrent-based 
system of punishment as a means to achieving more moral good in the 
world,
127
 there are legal philosophers who see such a system as directly 
 
 
Mr. Barger, I am inclined to agree with your attorney that under all the circumstances of this 
case, the sentence that I am required to impose by law is wholly inappropriate. Unfortunately, 
there is not a thing in the world I can do about it other than state on the record that under no 
circumstances, even if the court had discretion, would I ever impose a sentence this severe for 
the actions that you took on that date. . . . I have seen many cases where the aggravated 
assaults were far more serious than what you did, and the punishment was far, far less. The 
prosecutors do this every day. I don't know why this was prosecuted this way, but they have 
the discretion to prosecute you in the way that they see fit, and this Court doesn't have any 
discretion in what it has to do. 
Id. at 197–98.  
 122. See Luna, supra note 6. 
 123. Comm’n Rept., supra note 32, at 101; see also David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and 
Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J. L. & ECON. 285, 311 
(2001) (demonstrating “large differences in the length of sentence exist on the basis of race, gender, 
education, income, and citizenship.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal 
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 818 (2010) (“The safest conclusion from the 
literature thus far would be that the perception of certain legal and extralegal sanctions does seem to 
act as a modest deterrent factor, but that the perceived severity and celerity of punishment do not 
appear to be effective deterrents to crime, and we know virtually nothing about celerity.”). 
 125. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two 
Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & JUST. 65, 90–100 (2009); see also Luna, supra note 6 
(“certain offenses subject to mandatory minimums can draw upon a large supply of potential 
participants; with drug organizations, for instance, an arrested dealer or courier is quickly replaced by 
another.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Lowenthal, supra note 33, at 84–85. Less than a decade following the enactment of 
the mandatory statutes described in Barger, the trial rate in that county went from 10.40% to 3.77% of 
all cases. Id. However, other studies show that this has not resulted in a reduction in crime, but merely 
an increase in guilty pleas, resulting in substantial increases in the costs of incurred by prison 
populations. Id. at 85 (“[T]he same mandatory sentence laws that induce guilty pleas have contributed 
substantially to recent increases in the cost of correctional services as prison populations have 
multiplied. Thus the fiscal consequences of charge-based mandatory punishment statutes are probably 
greater than legislatures anticipated.”). 
 127. See BENTHAM, supra note 109. 
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violating the very nature of human existence and believe free will and 
rationality to form the basis of humanity.
128
 A system that utilizes only 
incapacitation violates free will because it “does not leave those subjected 
to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own 
future conduct, but seeks to pre-empt their future choices by incapacitating 
them.”129 However, not even Kant would say that criminals should run 
free, for he believed that a penal system is a categorical imperative in 
itself.
130
 There are also arguments against deterrence being a goal of 
punishment as it treats humans as something less than human. The Idealist 
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel asserted strongly that while 
deterrent laws may give citizens a reason to obey a law, such laws treat a 
human “as a dog.”131 
Another argument against adopting a policy and system of mandatory 
minimum punishments is the fiscal consequences.
132
 Many states have 
adopted mandatory minimum sentencing similar to those found in the 
federal code.
133
 However, adoption of these mandatory sentences has 
resulted in unintended consequences to both the state and the members of 
the community. In the adoption of these severe sentences, states have 
imposed so-called “‘credit-card-sentencing polic[ies],’ in which the 
legislature enacts several severe penalties without any concern for whether 
the state has the necessary resources to shoulder the increased 
sentences.”134 According to Robin Campbell, these financial 
considerations have caused many former supporters of mandatory 
minimums to reconsider their positions on the subject.
135
 In Michigan, “the 
 
 
 128. See GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:447–448; see also DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 19–20. 
 129. ANTHONY DUFF, Legal Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., 2013), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/. 
 130. ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 6–20 (1993). 
 131. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 99 (S.W. Dyde trans., 1896) 
(1820) (“A threat assumes that a man is not free, and will compel him by vividly presenting a possible 
evil. Right and justice, how ever, must have their seat in freedom and in the will, and not in the 
restriction implied in menace. In this view of punishment it is much the same as when one raises a 
cane against a dog; a man is not treated in accordance with his dignity and honour, but as a dog.”). 
 132. See Barkow, supra note 101, at 805–06.  
 133. Id. at 806. Tennessee and Florida have created sentencing commissions and adopted 
mandatory minimum penalties for certain offenses. Id. 
 134. See id. (quoting Richard S. Frase, The Role of the Legislature, the Sentencing Commission, 
and Other Officials Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 355 
(1993)). 
 135.  See generally Robin Campbell, Dollars & Sentences: Legislators' Views on Prisons, 
Punishment, and the Budget Crisis, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.vera.org/ 
publication_pdf/204_398.pdf (noting that the budget crisis, combined with reduced public concern 
about crime, has led to current reforms in sentencing). See also Barkow, supra note 101, at 805–06. 
Barkow writes that if legislators “were dealing with a budget surplus or a rapidly rising crime rate, the 
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repeal of mandatory minimum drug sentences was projected to save the 
state $41 million dollars” and would “free up existing prison beds” to 
“make prison space available for more serious offenders.”136 While the 
financial consequences of mandatory minimum sentencing certainly 
appear to put a strain on state treasuries, the tough-on-crime rhetoric and 
political considerations appear to have outweighed the urgency for 
reform.
137
 For example, at a roundtable discussion by state legislators on 
the subject, some of the participants expressed concern that, if some 
inmate who was let out of prison early as a result of sentencing reform 
commits a “headline-making offense,” it could cause a “political 
backlash.”138  
V. THE SECOND FORMULATION OF KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
Utilitarianism is a moral theory characterized by its focus on the 
maximization of happiness in a community.
139
 Jeremy Bentham has stated 
the utilitarian view of punishment is justified only “in as far as it promises 
to exclude some greater evil.”140 The utilitarian does not care only about 
“future consequences”141 when considering a present decision. Punishment 
under this moral theory is justifiable only if the “punishment can be shown 
to promote effectively the interest of society . . . otherwise it is not.”142 
 
 
legislatures might not care as much about rationalizing prison resources if they see a greater benefit 
from get-tough rhetoric . . . [b]ut where the legislature has a reason to care about costs, these impact 
statements can have tremendous influence.” Id. She goes on to say that “state legislatures are interested 
in these resource impact statements when they face budget pressures, especially if crime rates are 
stable or declining.” Id. One state legislator from Texas stated “It is no longer fiscally possible, no 
matter how conservative you are, to incarcerate people and spend $150,000 each on them when a 
fraction of that money would probably get them free of their habit and in productive society.” Id. 
(citing Campell, supra note 135, at 8). Furthermore, he added, “Every 19-year-old first-time offender 
who sleeps in a prison bed in a prison that’s full denies me an opportunity to put an armed robber in a 
bed.” Id. Another representative stated “[t]here are some blocks in New Orleans that cost us $10 
million [a year],” he said, referring to the criminal justice costs incurred for offenders who live in these 
specific areas[.] . . . How do we redirect those dollars to try to turn the tide?” Id. (citing Campell, supra 
note 135, at 9).  
 136. See Administering Crime, supra note 101, at 807. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Campell, supra note 135, at 8. 
 139. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT vi (2d ed. 1823) (“[I]t is the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong[.]”) (italics omitted). 
 140. JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in WORKS, 
supra note 109, at 83. 
 141. JOHN RAWLS, TWO CONCEPTS OF RULES, IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 105, 107 
(H.B. Acton ed., 1969). 
 142. Id.  
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This type of future good is not limited to teaching a criminal not to 
commit such an act again.
143
 
Unlike the Utilitarian school of thought, Kant’s Categorical Imperative 
eschews notions of economic value or emotive responses to ethical 
dilemmas.
144
 Widely considered to be one of the forefathers of 
deontological ethics,
145
 the “fundamental premise” of Kant’s ethical 
framework stems from the idea that “liberty, autonomy, and human 
dignity are basic rights, whose restrictions require special 
justifications.”146  
Deontology is the theory of moral obligation.
147
 Deontology judges 
morality by examining the actions taken by individuals. This is a break 
from utilitarianism, which focuses more on the consequences of actions.
148
 
Kant’s moral philosophy stands for the principle that the ends do not 
necessarily justify the means.
149
 His concern with utilitarian 
consequentialism is that the actor cannot always know the actual 
consequences of his actions.
150
 How can we assess moral value by looking 
toward the effects and consequences of an action when those results are 
not necessarily what the actor intended? Deontology is the answer to this 
apparent indeterminacy of utilitarianism and “takes it to be a demand of 
reason that ethics—true ethics—be universally applicable.”151 Kant 
created a famous formula, the Categorical Imperative, to measure moral 
worth.
152
  
 
 
 143. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 50–52.  
 144. Michael Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity As a 
Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 TENN. L. REV. 291, 309 (2013). The two 
major, competing philosophies of normative ethics are deontology, which is grounded in an 
“individual’s moral rights and obligations,” and utilitarianism, which is grounded in “the consequences 
of actions and on evaluating which actions most contribute to human happiness.” Id. John Rawls 
writes, “by viewing people as subjects of desires and inclinations and assigning value to their 
satisfaction as such, (classical) utilitarianism is at odds with Kant's doctrine at a fundamental level.” 
JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 188 (Barbara Herman ed., 2000). 
 145. See infra note 150. 
 146. Id. 
 147. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deontology (last 
accessed Jan. 29, 2015). 
 148. Compare KANT, supra note 1, with A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, supra note 139. 
 149. PAUL GUYER, KANT 186 (Brian Leiter ed., 4th ed. 2008). 
 150. ALLEN D. ROSEN, KANT’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 185 (1993). 
 151. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like To Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1889, 1998–99 (1995). Ewald writes that for Kant “[t]he moral law must be valid, not just for 
all greengrocers or all Scandinavians or even all human beings, but for all rational creatures, 
everywhere, at all times. And for Kant this means that the moral law must be both necessary and a 
priori – that is, independent of and logically (although not historically) prior to all experience.” Id. 
 152. GUYER, supra note 149, at 179–80.  
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In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant established three 
formulations of the Categorical Imperative: (1) act only in accordance with 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law; (2) act, whether toward yourself or toward others, in such a 
way so that you are using humanity as an end in itself and not merely as a 
means; and (3) and every rational being must so act as if he were through 
his maxim always a legislating member in a universal kingdom of ends.
153
 
Kant’s second formulation, treating others not merely as means but as 
ends in themselves, is best suited to apply his moral framework in relation 
to mandatory minimums. 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative focuses on an individual’s relationship 
with humanity.
154
 By humanity, Kant most likely is referring to: 
those of our powers and capacities that characterize us as reasonable 
and rational persons who belong to the natural world. . . . These 
powers include, first, those of moral personality, which make it 
possible for us to have a good will and a good moral character; and 
second, those capacities and skills to be developed by culture: by 
the arts and sciences and so forth.
155
  
Further, in Groundwork, when Kant refers to humanity, he is referring to 
those who possess rationality and are able to participate in the universal 
moral framework.
156
 Indeed, Kant means “something more like biological 
human being insofar as they are also rational beings, and it is the 
embodiment of rational being rather than human life as such that he is 
declaring to be an end in itself.”157  
Kant’s earlier works espoused the importance of human freedom.158 
 
 
 153. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:420–4:429; see also GUYER, supra note 149, at 184–86. 
 154. See GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:428. 
 155. RAWLS, LECTURES, supra note 144.  
 156. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 110 (1996) (“Kant 
interchanges the terms of humanity and rationality” in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals). 
 157. GUYER, supra note 149, at 186.  
 158. Free will is a very important consideration in Kant’s early works. For example, in 
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime Kant wrote: 
The human being has his own inclinations, and by means of his capacity of choice a clue from 
our nature to conduct his actions in accordance with these. Nothing can be more appalling 
than that the actions of a human stand under the will of another. Hence no abhorrence can be 
more natural that that which a person has against servitude. On this account a child cries and 
becomes bitter if it has to do what another wants without having made an effort to make that 
pleasing to him. And it wishes only to become a man quickly and to operate in accordance 
with its own will. 
IMMANUEL KANT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME 125 (Patrick 
Frierson et al. trans., 2011).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss2/8
  
 
 
 
 
2016] KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 257 
 
 
 
 
According to Paul Guyer, the rule is that one’s “use of freedom on one 
occasion be consistent with my continued use of it on all other possible 
occasions, and that my use of freedom be consistent with everyone else’s 
use of their freedom.”159 Human love for autonomy is present in Kant’s 
formulations of his Categorical Imperative, for if one were to universalize 
a faulty maxim
160
 or use another person merely as a means to achieve 
another end, the freedom of some will be affected. Humanity’s capacity to 
make free moral choices is not dynamic but the same in every human 
being, for it is the capacity of rational thought, not the realization of such, 
that entails membership in Kant’s “kingdom of ends.”161  
Kant provides four prominent examples in Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals on how to apply the second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative: “one each a perfect duty to self, a perfect duty to 
others, imperfect duty to self, and imperfect duty to others.”162 Kant 
 
 
 159. GUYER, supra note 149, at 178. 
 160. Id. at 182. This would be how to analyze the moral worth of an act under Kant’s first 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative. “A maxim is the principle on which one actually acts[.]” Id. 
Take for instance Guyer’s example maxim, “I will enrich myself at all costs.” This “could not be acted 
on by everyone, because something that [one person] might do under that maxim is bound to conflict 
with something somebody else would do.” Id.  
 161. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:433; ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 115 
(1999); see also Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves, supra note 2, at 276 (“[D]ignity attaches 
because of mankind's mere capacity for rational moral willing, and not because a person actually does 
the right thing or acts from the right motive.”); Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 144, at 309 (“Kant 
therefore contended that humanity, so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has 
dignity, and that this capacity provides every person an intrinsic dignity that every other person must 
respect.”). In the Groundwork, Kant describes the Kingdom of ends as follows: 
By a kingdom I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common 
laws. Now since laws determine ends in terms of their universal validity, if we abstract from 
the personal differences of rational beings as well as from all the content of their private ends 
we shall be able to think of a whole of all ends in systematic connection[.] . . . For, all rational 
being stand under the law that each of them is to treat himself and all others never merely as a 
means but always at the same time as ends in themselves. But from this there arises a 
systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, that is, a kingdom, 
which can be called a kingdom of ends . . . because what these law have as their purpose is 
just the relation of these being to one another as ends and means. 
GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:433. 
 162. GUYER, supra note 149, at 196. Briefly, duties are those things that are required of humans 
by the three formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Id. at 194–96. Kant uses examples of perfect 
and imperfect duties in the Groundwork. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:429–431. Perfect duties are 
those that one must always do or perform, and imperfect duties are those that one must not ignore, but 
for which there are multiple ways to achieve that duty. GUYER, supra note 149, at 196–98. This 
distinction is discussed further infra. However, when Kant uses the word “duty” he “does not mean to 
say that duties are constituted by inflexible, inviolable moral rules, nor does he think that when a duty 
is in question we may never consult our inclinations concerning what to do.” KANT’S ETHICAL 
THOUGHT, supra note 161, at 44. Instead the distinction between perfect and imperfect is more 
accurately characterized as “owed” and “meritorious” respectively. Id. Imperfect duties are “wide” and 
require us to “set ends.” Id. Finally, Kant makes a distinction between those duties that are done “in 
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describes the prohibition against suicide as perfect duty to one’s self.163 He 
argues that one cannot “dispose of a human being in [one’s] own person 
by maiming, damaging, or killing him.”164 Kant says this violates the 
second formulation because if one “destroys himself in order to escape 
from a trying condition he makes use of a person merely as a means to 
maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life.”165 In Kant’s view, to 
commit suicide is to use or destroy one’s own humanity to achieve a 
certain condition (i.e. relief).
166
 
While the prohibition against suicide is one example,
167
 Kant instead 
uses the prohibition of false promises as an example of a perfect duty to 
others.
168
 In illustrating how false promises would treat others merely as a 
means, Kant states that when one makes a promise with no intention of 
keeping that promise, he fails to treat others as ends in themselves because 
their capacity to choose their own ends freely has been limited.
169
 This 
application shows that the Categorical Imperative stands not just for the 
continued existence of others’ freedom, but also the “capacity to exercise 
their freedom by choosing their own ends.”170 The examples that Kant 
 
 
conformity with duty” and those that are done “from duty.” GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:397–98. 
While actions performed in conformity with duty are not worthless, it is an act “[o]nly . . . done from 
duty, Kant says, [that] have true moral worth or moral content.” KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT, supra 
note 164, at 27.  
 163. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:429; see also GUYER, supra note 149, at 196–97. Kant was 
very familiar with the topic of permissible suicide that existed in Stoic and Epicurean Philosophies, 
and frequently discussed such topics with his students in his lectures. Suicide was also a “fashionable 
topic in eighteenth-century Germany after the publication of Johann Goethe’s bestseller The Sorrows 
of Young Werther (1774).” Id. at 196. 
 164. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:430. In Kant’s lectures, he clarifies this concept stating that 
suicide is a unique topic due to “the fact that man uses his freedom to destroy himself, when he ought 
to use it solely to live as a man.” GUYER, supra note 149, at 197. He goes on to say that man may 
certainly “dispose” of all things that have to do with his person, but “not over the person itself, not can 
he use freedom against himself.” Id. For Kant, the act of suicide is a manifestation of free will, an 
important pillar for Kant’s ethical framework. Id. However, this “one free act” would prohibit any 
future free act. Id. Kant’s assertion of humanity as freedom means that no free act “can be considered 
in isolation,” but freedom is “an on-going condition” that must be preserved. Id. Kant’s lectures appear 
to hedge slightly on his opinion of the prohibition of suicide as a perfect duty to self. Id. To illustrate 
discusses the martyrdom of Cato in Ancient Rome, who “killed himself not to escape the tyranny of 
Julius Caesar personally but rather to . . . save many more free beings.” Id. This discussion shows that 
preservation of humanity, or freedom, should always be the end, but that does not necessarily mean 
one has a duty to increase humanity. Id. at 197–98.  
 165. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:430. 
 166. GUYER, supra note 149, at 196. According to Guyer, Kant would probably make the same 
type of argument against homicide of any kind—not just suicide. Id. 
 167. Id. at 198 (demonstrating that the rationale behind suicide also applies to homicides). 
 168. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:429–430. 
 169. Id. 
 170. GUYER, supra note 149, at 199. This does not mean that people are not permitted to make 
promises to others that they intend to keep (e.g., through a contract). Id. This type of relationship, 
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uses that exemplify perfect duties to self and others “can plausibly be 
analyzed as duties to preserve the existence and the possibility of the 
exercise of humanity, as the capacity to set and pursue ends freely.”171 
Kant specifies two imperfect duties that are relevant to mandatory 
minimum sentencing: the duty to cultivate one’s own talents and skills, 
and the duty to aid others.
172
 The idea behind these imperfect duties is that 
no human is born having perfected oneself.
173
 When young or 
inexperienced, one depends on both one’s own practice and the assistance 
of others to develop one’s abilities.174 The reason to set ends in this way 
and to assist others in achieving their ends is not based in the utilitarian 
notion that the result would be an increase of happiness in the world. 
Instead, Kant argues that the more that we do these meritorious acts, the 
more people will be able to freely pursue ends in the world.
175
  
A “categorical imperative,” as it fits into Kant’s morality, is a required 
action that is not at all influenced by one’s inclinations or reservations.176 
If it is to be independent of all wants and desires, this law must be pure in 
nature. Kant writes that “it is a question of objective practical laws” that 
hold true for all people regardless of what their lower faculties tell them.
177
 
Punishments by a court raise concerns under this second formulation of his 
moral philosophy.  
Kant frequently lectured on law.
178
 However, according to William 
Ewald, “it is not entirely clear whether Kant's legal philosophy is 
consistent with his general moral philosophy, let alone (as Kant claims) 
derivable from it.”179 Nonetheless, the Categorical Imperative is certainly 
“at the top of the hierarchy” of Kant’s system of legal philosophy.180 
Kant’s philosophy of punishment is largely considered to be retributivist181 
 
 
where one voluntarily allows oneself to be used as a means because he is at the same time being 
treated as an end in oneself. Id. This satisfies the second formulation so long as the contract is entered 
into freely. Id. 
 171. Id. at 199. 
 172. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:430.  
 173. GUYER, supra note 149, at 202–03. 
 174. Id. at 200.  
 175. Id. at 201. 
 176. See id. at 186. 
 177. GROUNDWORK, supra note 1, at 4:427. 
 178. Ewald, supra note 151, at 1997. 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 2001. 
 181. See DRESSLER, supra note 8, at 16–18. 
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in nature, but the foundation for his philosophy is very clearly grounded in 
his moral philosophy. Kant wrote:  
Any opposition that counteracts the hindrance of an effect promotes 
that effect and is consistent with it. Now, everything that is unjust is 
a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws. Coercion, 
however, is a hindrance or opposition to freedom. Consequently, if 
a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according 
to universal laws (that is, is unjust), then the use of coercion to 
counteract it, inasmuch as it is the prevention of a hindrance to 
freedom, is consistent with freedom according to universal laws; in 
other words, this use of coercion is just.
182
 
From this, it is clear that certain limitations on freedom are necessary and 
just, according to Kant, when actions will affect others’ freedom. 
However, Kant’s Philosophy of Law183 stands for the principle that 
punishment can never be administered as a means for promoting some 
other good. Of the justifications proponents advance to justify the use of 
mandatory minimums, nearly all point to a goal that treats the criminal 
defendant merely as a means and not as an end in himself.
184
 
VI. MANDATORY MINIMUMS AND TREATING HUMANS AS ENDS IN 
THEMSELVES 
Kant directly addresses criminal punishment in his Metaphysics of 
Morals.
185
 While he maintains that punishment by a court “can never be 
inflicted merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal 
himself or for civil society[,] [punishment] must always be inflicted upon 
[the criminal] because he has committed a crime.”186 Thus, Kant does not 
close the door on punishment, nor does he even close the door on 
deterrence-influenced criminal justice system, as such a system runs the 
risk of treating criminals merely as a means.
187
 Kant’s objection to certain 
 
 
 182. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 231 (J. Ladd trans., 1965). 
 183. Ewald, supra note 151, at 2002 (“The Categorical Imperative has a double use in Kant's late 
legal philosophy—a juridical use and an ethical use. The distinction comes down to a distinction 
between external behavior and internal motivation. The use is juridical when the Categorical 
Imperative is applied to external actions; that is, when it is used to say whether a particular bit of 
external behavior, like paying a debt, is legally right or not—regardless of the motive from which it is 
performed.”). 
 184. See supra Part IV. 
 185. METAPHYSICS, supra note 4, at 6:331–6:332. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Wright, supra note 2, at 273–75. 
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deterrence-based punishments is not that defendants are treated as a 
means; rather, it is an objection “to treating persons merely as a means, or 
as a means and not at the same time as ends in themselves.”188 
Certain punishments, even mandatory punishments, could be both 
deterrence-based and not treat those charged merely as means. For 
example, mandatory imprisonment for certain drug offenses
189
 may, in 
certain circumstances, deter individuals from trafficking drugs, but still 
have the effect of rehabilitating those convicted, treating them as an end-
in-themselves. However, there are certainly instances under the federal 
mandatory sentencing that have the effect of “making some persons utterly 
incapable of choice would presumably fail to treat such persons as 
ends.”190 For example, a mandatory minimum sentence of life 
imprisonment under the three-strikes law
191
 might appear to have a hint of 
evenhandedness insofar as it punishes all criminals similarly. It might even 
be a law, consented to by citizens as rational beings, free to consent to 
whatever social contracts one wishes.
192
 However, the legislative intent 
behind such guidelines overlooks Kant’s second formulation and thus fails 
to be moral in the Kantian sense. The defendant has been removed from 
society entirely. There is no apparent goal of rehabilitation or reintegration 
for a criminal charged under the three-strikes law. A law such as this one 
essentially amounts to a preventive detention of one’s future conduct.193 
Thus, while not all statutorily mandated minimum sentencing violates 
Kant’s second formulation, when such a punishment’s only apparent goal 
is to deter future wrongdoers and take preventive measures not in 
proportion to the crime, it fails to respect human dignity (rationality). 
Statutes like the three-strikes law are inapposite to Kant’s philosophy. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that mandatory minimum sentencing in the 
current federal code fails to be moral under the second formulation of 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative: treating others not merely as a means, but 
as ends-in-themselves. The implementation of mandatory punishments has 
 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See, e.g., supra note 70.  
 190. See Wright, supra note 2, at 290. 
 191. See supra note 70. 
 192. See Wright, supra note 2, at 314 (“Kant's own explicit logic is contractarian, but his 
underlying logic should be one of universality, reason, and intrinsic worth.”). 
 193. Id. at 287 (“Certainly, Kant seems committed to limiting punishment to cases of the actual 
commission of a crime, and thus, to oppose preventive detention.”). 
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been present since ancient times. Today, lawmakers and proponents often 
point to the deterrent effects of mandatory sentencing requirements. 
However, the use of the lengthy incarceration as a deterrent fails to 
recognize prisoners as being rational ends-in-themselves. 
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